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When Is Utilitarian Welfare Higher Under
Insurance Risk Pooling?
Indradeb Chatterjee, Angus S. Macdonald, Pradip Tapadar and R. Guy Thomas
Abstract This paper focuses on the effects of bans on insurance risk classification
on utilitarian social welfare. We consider two regimes: full risk classification, where
insurers charge the actuarially fair premium for each risk, and pooling, where risk
classification is banned and for institutional or regulatory reasons, insurers do not
attempt to separate risk classes, but charge a common premium for all risks. For the
case of iso-elastic insurance demand, we derive sufficient conditions on higher and
lower risks’ demand elasticities which ensure that utilitarian social welfare is higher
under pooling than under full risk classification. Empirical evidence suggests that
these conditions may be realistic for some insurance markets.
1 Outline Of Our Approach
We consider two alternative regimes: full risk classification, where insurers charge
the actuarially fair premium for each risk, and pooling, where risk classification
is banned and insurers charge a common premium for all risks. Pooling implies a
redistribution from lower risks towards higher risks. The outcome in terms of util-
itarian social welfare depends on how we evaluate the trade-off between the utility
gains and losses of the two types.
Such evaluations are typically made with models which assume that all individ-
uals share a common utility function. Given an offered premium, individuals with
the same probabilities of loss (i.e. individuals from the same risk-group) then all
make the same purchasing decision. However, this does not correspond well to the
observable reality of many insurance markets, where individuals with similar prob-
abilities of loss often appear to make different decisions, and many individuals do
not purchase insurance at all.
To reproduce observable reality, we instead introduce heterogeneity of utility
functions (not necessarily all risk-averse) across individuals from any given risk-
group. Individual utility functions then determine individual purchasing decisions,
which (when aggregated) determine the insurance demand curve, and hence the
equilibrium price of insurance when all risks are pooled.
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Individual utility functions also determine the expected utilities which individu-
als assign to their outcomes given an insurance price. The measure of social welfare
is expected utility given the distributions of loss probabilities and risk preferences.
2 Model Set-up
2.1 Insurance Demand from the Individual Viewpoint
Suppose that an individual has wealth W and risks losing an amount L with prob-
ability µ . The individual’s utility of wealth is given by u(·), where u′(·) > 0. The
individual is offered insurance against the potential loss amount L at premium pi
(per unit of loss), i.e. for a payment of pi L. He will purchase insurance if:
u(W −pi L)> (1−µ)u(W )+µ u(W −L). (1)
Since certainty-equivalent decisions do not depend on the origin and scale of a utility
function, standardising u(W ) = 1 and u(W −L) = 0, simplifies the decision rule to:
u(W −pi L)> (1−µ). (2)
Assuming small premiums (such that the second and higher-order terms in the Tay-
lor series of expansion of u(W −piL) are negligible), we can then write:
u(W −pi L)≈ u(W )−pi Lu′(W ) = 1−pi Lu′(W ), as u(W ) = 1 (3)
and hence the decision rule becomes:
γ < v. (4)
where γ = Lu′(W ) is the risk preferences index and v= µ/pi is risk-premium ratio.
2.2 Insurance Demand from the Insurer’s Viewpoint
From an insurer’s perspective, it cannot observe individual utility functions; it ob-
serves only the proportion of each risk-group who choose to buy insurance. We call
this a (proportional) demand function and define it as:
d(pi) = P [γ < v] . (5)
It can be shown that if the underlying random variable Γ from which individual
realisations of γ are generated has a particular distribution, this implies the iso-
elastic demand function:






where λ is the constant elasticity of demand and τ is the fair-premium demand.
2.3 Market Equilibrium and Social Welfare
We assume a market with n risk-groups, where competition between insurers leads
to zero expected profits in equilibrium. We define a risk classification regime as a
vector of premiums (pi1,pi2, . . . ,pin) charged to the risk-groups. Social welfare, S(pi),
under that regime is the expected utility of an individual selected at random from






















(pii−µi) = 0. (8)
3 Results For Iso-Elastic Demand
Result 3.1 Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks µ1 < µ2 < · · · < µn and the
same iso-elastic demand elasticity λ > 0. Then λ ≤ 1⇒ S(pi0)≥ S(µ).
Result 3.1 says that if the common demand elasticity for all risk-groups is less
than 1, pooling gives higher social welfare than full risk classification.
Result 3.1 assumes constant iso-elastic demand elasticity for all individuals.
However, for most goods and services, we expect demand elasticity to rise with
price, because of the income effect on demand: at higher prices, the good forms a
larger part of the consumer’s total budget constraint, and so the effect of a small per-
centage change in its price might be larger. For insurance this suggests that demand
elasticity for higher risks might be higher. This motivates the following Result 3.2:
Result 3.2 Suppose there are n risk-groups with risks µ1 < µ2 < · · ·< µn with iso-
elastic demand elasticities λ1,λ2, . . . ,λn respectively. Define λlo =max{λi : µi ≤ pi0}
and λhi =min{λi : µi > pi0} where pi0 is the pooled equilibrium premium. If λi < 1
for all i= 1,2, . . . ,n and λlo ≤ λhi, then S(pi0)≥ S(µ).
Roughly speaking, Result 3.2 says that if all higher risk-groups’ (iso-elastic) de-
mand elasticities are higher than all lower risk-groups’ (iso-elastic) demand elastic-
ities, and all demand elasticities are less than 1, then social welfare is higher under
pooling than under full risk classification.









0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
λ1
λ 2
S(pi0) > S(µ) everywhere to left of boundary curve
S(pi0) < S(µ) everywhere to right of boundary curve
S(pi0) > S(µ)guaranteed in shaded area
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Fig. 1 Social welfare is higher under pooling to the left of the curve (guaranteed for any population
structure in green triangle)
For the two risk-groups case, Result 3.2 references the green triangle in Figure
1. The two axes represent demand elasticities for lower and higher risk-groups, λ1
and λ2. Social welfare under pooling is higher than under full risk classification
everywhere on the left of the boundary curve, and lower everywhere on the right.
The exact position of the boundary curve depends on the population structure and
relative risks; the curve shown is for µ2/µ1 = 4 and 80% of the population are
low risks. The sufficient conditions in Result 3.2 specify that in the shaded triangle
where λ1 ≤ λ2 < 1, social welfare under pooling is always higher than that under
full risk classification, irrespective of the population structure and relative risks.
4 Discussion
The conditions in the above results encompass many plausible combinations of
higher and lower risks’ demand elasticities. The conditions are stringent because
they are sufficient for any population structures and relative risks, but they are not
necessary (as shown by the white areas to the left of the boundary in Figure 1).
A condition common to both results is that all demand elasticities should be
less than 1. Most relevant empirical estimates found in literature are of magnitude
significantly less than 1. Whilst the various contexts in which these estimates were
made may not correspond closely to the set-up in this paper, it is at least suggestive
of the possibility that insurance demand elasticities may typically be less than 1.
